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Abstract 
It is a commonly understood problem in education that many highly 
qualified teachers tend to gravitate toward higher performing schools, 
including schools with lower minority enrollments and lower incidence of 
poverty. This article explores the distribution of a subset of teachers, 
namely, those who are National Board Certified. To what extent do these 
teachers’ assignment choices mirror the pattern of their non-Board 
Certified colleagues and to what extent are they different? Part of a larger 
study of Board Certified Teachers in lower performing schools, the article 
examines the distribution of NBCTs in the six states with the largest 
number of them—California, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, 
and South Carolina. The research finds that, with the exception of 
California, Board Certified Teachers are not equitably distributed across 
schools that serve different populations of students. In five of the six 
states examined, poor, minority, and lower performing students are far 
less likely to benefit from the teaching of an NBCT than are their more 
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affluent, majority, higher performing peers. The article explores some 
possible explanations for the California distribution pattern as well as the 
kinds of incentives provided across the states for teachers to seek Board 
Certification and for those who earn it. The authors conclude with a 
rationale and a set of policy suggestions for realigning the distribution of 
NBCTs. 
Introduction 
When the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards was launched in 1987, it 
represented the cutting edge of the teacher quality movement.  Created as an outgrowth of the 
Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, the National Board was established to create 
rigorous standards for what, in now-familiar National Board vernacular, “accomplished teachers 
should know and be able to do.”  A voluntary system, the National Board certifies teachers who 
meet these standards.  State certification represents the floor, a set of minimum licensing 
requirements.  National Board Certification is designed to reflect a substantially higher level of 
professional achievement.  In effect, National Board Certification is meant to bring teaching 
more in line with other professions in which state licensing boards set minimum standards and 
the profession sets standards for advanced certification to identify accomplished practice. 
In the span of a decade and a half, promoting the National Board has become a 
significant state and local policy strategy to improve teaching.  Policy-makers and educators 
across the nation have adopted National Board Certification as a proxy for accomplished 
teaching.  As of March 2004, all 50 states and approximately 538 school districts offered 
financial incentives for teachers to pursue National Board Certification and additional kinds of 
incentives, including salary bonuses, for those who earn it (NBPTS, 2004a). 
The National Board also represents a substantial fiscal commitment.  Over the years, the 
federal government, states, local school districts, and philanthropic foundations have invested 
well over $200 million to develop and implement the National Board (Teacher Quality Bulletin, 
2003).1  As larger numbers of teachers have earned Board Certification—the total stood at more 
than 32,000 as of November 2003—and the dollar commitment to fuller implementation has 
grown, some policy-makers have begun to wonder whether results justify the price tag.  For 
example, California’s budget crisis, and the need to select among competing fiscal priorities, 
caused that state to eliminate the $10,000 bonus it awarded to all teachers who earned National 
Board Certification.  Although California has thus far maintained a $20,000 award for National 
Board Certified Teachers (NBCTs) working in low-performing schools, other states are 
reconsidering their investments.2  Georgia, which has offered a 10 percent salary bonus to every 
teacher in that state who earns National Board Certification, is considering scaling back this 
incentive since the cost has tripled from one fiscal year to the next (Sack, 2003). 
As policy-makers consider investments in the National Board Certification process, 
questions about the impact of these investments on student achievement naturally arise.  Early 
indications suggested that NBCTs contribute to student learning (Bond, 2000).  A new study 
                                                   
1  This estimate includes $74 million in reimbursement of application fees of successful candidates and 
$130 million from the U.S. Department of Education but does not include funds from philanthropic 
foundations. The Bush administration recently announced that it is eliminating federal funding for the 
National Board. 
2  California defines low-performing schools as those scoring in the bottom 50 percent on state tests.  
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using North Carolina data found that National Board Certified Teachers are more successful at 
raising student achievement, than teachers who applied but did not earn certification particularly 
among teachers of low-income students (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2004).  In addition, a recent 
study on the impact of National Board Certified Teachers on student achievement in 14 Arizona 
school districts argued that the students of National Board Certified Teachers had greater gain 
scores than students of teachers without certification (Vandevoort, Amrein-Beardsley, & 
Berliner, 2004).  However, additional definitive research is still under way, and we suspect it will 
be many years before the research community sorts out the effects of NBCTs from the effects 
of other factors that influence student achievement.  Meanwhile, policy-makers are shaping 
policy regarding NBCTs. 
Without diminishing the importance of the student achievement aspect, this paper 
addresses an equally important question for policy-makers: what is the distribution of NBCTs 
across schools that serve different populations of students?  In other words, we examine to what 
extent NBCTs are found in higher-performing, typically more affluent schools and to what 
extent they are found in lower-performing, often economically poorer schools. 3 
We believe that this is a critical issue for policy-makers as they consider their investments 
in the National Board Certification process.  More than 35 years ago, the political scientist David 
Easton defined politics as “the authoritative allocation of [societal] values” (Easton, 1965).  If 
state and local policies about NBCTs, which influence where they teach and why, are values 
made real, then an examination of these policies should reveal something about our collective 
beliefs about which students ought to have access to the most highly recognized teachers. 
The next section of this paper addresses the National Board Certification as a school 
improvement strategy.  Subsequent sections take up the issues of teacher distribution generally, 
the distribution of National Board Certified Teachers specifically, and policies that influence 
teacher assignment decisions.  The paper concludes with a set of policy implications and actions 
for states, school districts, and the National Board itself to consider. 
National Board Certification and Education Improvement 
National Board Certification, a centerpiece of nationwide efforts to boost the profile of 
high-quality teaching, reflects a major policy emphasis on improving teaching as central to 
improving student learning.  Research about the impact of effective teaching has reinforced what 
common sense would suggest: teaching matters.  Study after study confirms that students who 
have high-quality teachers post significant and lasting achievement gains.  Those with less-
effective teachers play a constant, and often losing, game of academic catch-up (Koppich, 2001).  
In a Texas study, for example, nearly half the difference in test scores between white and 
African-American students was attributable to variation in teacher quality (Ferguson, 1991).  A 
study by Hanushek and his colleagues revealed that the most-effective teachers were able to 
boost their students’ learning a full grade level more than did less-effective teachers.  Replacing 
an average teacher with an excellent one, according to this study, nearly erased the gap in 
mathematics performance between students from low-income and high-income households. 
(The Teaching Commission, 2004) 
                                                   
3  This article is part of a study, “The Impact of National Board Certified Teachers on Low-Performing 
Schools,” funded by Atlantic Philanthropies and is a cooperative effort of SRI International, WestEd, 
the Southeast Center for Teacher Quality, and J. Koppich & Associates. 
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Research on value-added assessment, which attempts to distinguish teachers’ 
contributions to student learning from other contributing or distracting factors, further 
reinforces that the quality of teaching makes a difference in levels of student learning.  A series 
of Tennessee studies revealed that excellent teachers produce greater learning gains regardless of 
the academic starting points of their students.4 
The conclusion seems inescapable.  In the words of the National Commission on 
Teaching & America’s Future (1996), “What teachers know and can do makes the crucial 
difference in what children learn.”  The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
finds its foundation in this conclusion.   
The National Board was developed as a central component of what was described as a 
“new framework for teaching, … a system in which school districts can offer the pay, autonomy, 
and career opportunities necessary to attract to teaching highly qualified people who would 
otherwise take up other professional careers.  In return, teachers would agree to higher standards 
for themselves and real accountability for student performance” (Carnegie, 1986). 
Findings about effective teaching were used by the National Board to design research-
based core propositions for the occupation.  These hold that:  
· Teachers are committed to students and their learning. 
· Teachers know the subjects they teach and how to teach those subjects to students. 
· Teachers are responsible for managing and monitoring student learning. 
· Teachers think systematically about their practice and learn from experience. 
· Teachers are members of learning communities. 
National Board Certification is not achieved by means of a classic paper-and-pencil 
exam, nor does the process assess just a single dimension of teaching.  Board Certification 
assesses teachers’ subject matter knowledge, a critical component of effective teaching.  In 
addition, Board candidates must prepare a professional portfolio.  Requiring as much as 300 
hours of work to assemble, the portfolio includes a videotaped exemplar of the candidate’s 
teaching and an explanation of his or her instructional choices, as well as multiple samples of 
student work, a description of the way in which the work was analyzed, actions taken to 
remediate students’ academic deficiencies, and a review of students’ subsequent progress.  In 
sum, National Board Certification is designed to appraise multiple dimensions of effective 
teaching, ranging from teachers’ knowledge of the disciplines they teach to their ability to 
diagnose and “treat” students’ learning needs. 
Teachers who meet the National Board’s professional standards generally are considered 
to be valuable members of their school communities.  But where NBCTs teach is an important 
question for policy-makers on two related dimensions: distribution of teaching expertise and 
distribution of resources.  We turn first to an examination of the distribution of well-qualified 
teachers generally, and then take a closer look at the kinds of schools in which NBCTs are most 
likely to be found. 
                                                   
4 The Tennessee value-added research was conducted by Dr. William Sanders. Other studies—see, for 
example, Kupermintz (2003)—suggest that value-added needs further refinement. But we believe the 
results are substantial enough that they cannot be ignored. 
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The Teacher Distribution Dilemma 
We know from previous research that high-caliber teachers often are in short supply in 
low-performing schools.  For example, secondary students in low-performing schools are twice 
as likely as those in high-performing schools to be taught by teachers who are not certified in the 
subjects they are teaching.  Half of middle school students and one-third of high school students 
in high-poverty (and typically low-performing) schools are in at least one class taught by a 
teacher who did not complete even a college minor in the subject (Education Week, 2003).  
Research also has demonstrated that experience leads to greater teaching proficiency 
(Wilson, Floden & Ferrini-Mundy, 2001).  We know, however, that teachers in high-poverty, 
high-minority schools are likely to have less teaching experience than their colleagues in low-
poverty, higher-performing schools.  As Education Week reported in Quality Counts 2003, “For 
states to end the ‘achievement gap’ between minority and non-minority students and those from 
rich and poor families, they must first end the ‘teacher gap’: the dearth of well-qualified teachers 
for those who need them most.”  
This is not to suggest that excellent teachers cannot be found in low-performing schools.  
They can be and are.  But the relative lack of highly qualified teachers in these teaching 
circumstances has long been apparent.  This situation results from a confluence of factors, 
including substandard working conditions, a paucity of incentives (including financial incentives) 
for high-quality teachers to choose difficult teaching environments, long-standing policies and 
practices related to teacher transfer and assignment, and the culture of teaching itself. 
Although it is not entirely clear what factors attract or keep high-caliber teachers at 
certain schools, research suggests that working conditions play an essential role.  An analysis of 
the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) data by Education Week found that teachers in  
high-poverty and high-minority schools report much more difficult working conditions—higher 
transiency and turnover rates among students, teachers, and administrators; fewer available 
resources; less-well-maintained facilities; a less-collaborative school culture; and more-difficult 
community and parent circumstances (Education Week, 2003).  These conditions contribute to 
heightened concern among teachers in low-performing schools about being able to demonstrate 
excellence (Public Agenda, 2003).  
Lack of financial incentives also affects teacher assignments.  Most teachers continue to 
be paid on the standard single salary schedule.  Compensation rises with years of experience and 
college credits accrued.  This salary construct typically grants no special economic benefits to 
teachers willing to tackle the toughest assignments.  Districts are left with little means financially 
to lure particularly well-qualified teachers to struggling schools.  
This situation gives rise to a significant corollary to the skewed distribution of expert 
teachers, namely, the maldistribution of resources.  Less-experienced, often less-well-qualified, 
and lower-paid teachers are concentrated in lower-performing schools, and these schools find 
themselves with a reduced level of absolute resources compared with higher-performing schools 
with more-experienced, better-paid teachers (Roza & Hill, 2004). 
A third challenge to attracting highly qualified teachers to low-performing schools and 
retaining them there is created by long-standing policy and practice related to teacher transfer 
and assignment.  For example, transfer policies in a number of districts allow teachers who may 
initially find themselves assigned to low-performing schools to move to greener school pastures 
once they have accrued a modest amount of seniority.  In the absence of incentives to remain in 
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these challenging work environments, many take that opportunity, only to be replaced at low-
performing schools by their less-experienced colleagues. 
Still other policies hamper interdistrict transfers, even among teachers who might 
consider moving to low-performing schools, albeit in a different district.  For example, leaving 
one district for another, even for one with a similar or higher pay structure, may require a 
teacher to take a pay cut when local or state policy caps an interdistrict transfer’s placement on 
the salary schedule. 
Finally, there is the culture of the profession itself.  Teaching ascribes greater prestige to 
those who teach in higher-performing schools.  In other words, one’s professional status is often 
a function of how elite one’s students are (Haycock, 2000).  Those who teach in low-performing 
schools are neither lauded nor applauded for the challenges they have assumed.  On the 
contrary, teachers in low-performing schools often feel stigmatized by low expectations for 
themselves and their students (Public Agenda, 2003). 
Attracting high-quality teachers to low-performing schools is only half the dilemma.  
Retaining them at these schools can also be problematic.  According to data from the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), teachers in schools with minority enrollments of 50 
percent or more transfer at twice the rate of teachers in schools with fewer minority students.  
Moreover, when teachers transfer to different schools, even within urban districts, they tend to 
seek schools with higher student achievement, fewer black or Hispanic students, and fewer 
students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (Hanushek, 2001).  
If the distribution of teachers in the general teaching population, then, is tilted toward 
concentrating more-experienced, better-qualified educators in higher-performing schools, does 
this same pattern obtain for NBCTs? Are they, too, more likely to be found in higher-
performing than in lower-performing schools? 
We turn now to an examination of the kinds of schools in which NBCTs teach. 
Where Do NBCTs Teach?  
Since the first teachers earned National Board Certification in 1993, more than 30,000 
teachers have joined their ranks in every state.  Beyond these figures, what is known about where 
NBCTs teach?  At least one early study from North Carolina suggested that NBCTs are rather 
scarce in low-performing, low-income schools with high concentrations of minority students 
(Goldhaber, 2003). 
To answer the question about NBCT distribution more completely, we examined the 
assignments of Board Certified teachers by school type in the six states with the largest number 
of NBCTs—California, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina.  These 
states represent more than 65 percent of all NBCTs nationwide (NBPTS, 2004b).  We limited 
our analysis to NBCTs who have earned certification since 19985.  Figure 1 displays the number 
of teachers certified by the National Board since 1998 in each of the six states we examined. 
 
                                                   
5  In our efforts to verify the location of NBCTs, we found that information from the National Board’s 
database was often inaccurate. As a result, we believe that a more accurate analysis is done with the 
cohort of NBCTs since 1998. These NBCTs represent 58% of the total nationwide. 
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Figure 1. NBCTs since 1998, by State 
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Source: NBPTS (2004); SRI analysis.  
 
 
It is worth noting that our analysis includes only NBCTs who are teaching in schools 
and only those teachers who earned certification since 1998.  Thus, the total number of NBCTs 
in each state actually is higher, but the limits of the data required us to make some choices.  For 
example, 2,644 teachers in California have earned certification, but only 2,292 have been 
certified since 1998 and only 2,261 of those are working in schools. 
We began our analysis by looking at the overall distribution of NBCTs by school type in 
our six states.  Specifically, we were interested in the percentage of NBCTs working in schools 
serving high-poverty students, high concentrations of minority students, and low-performing 
students.  Figure 2 illustrates the percentages of NBCTs who teach in these high-need schools. 
 Figure 2. NBCTs Working in High-Minority, High-Poverty, and Low-Performing Schools 
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Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), MDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004), NCDPI 
(2004), ODE (2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
Of the 18,806 NBCTs in our analysis who earned certification since 1998, 2,297, or 12%, 
teach in schools with 75% or more students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.  Similarly, 
3,076 NBCTs, or 16% of the total, teach in schools serving 75% or more minority students.  
Finally, 3,521 NBCTs, or 19%, work in low-performing schools.6 
Despite the fact that NBCTs are found in these high-need schools, they are not well 
represented in these schools in five of our six states.  For example, with the exception of 
California, NBCTs are underrepresented in schools with high concentrations of minority 
students.  Figure  3 compares the percentages of NBCTs in schools with at least 75 percent 
minority students with the respective statewide percentages of teachers in these schools.  
 
                                                   
6  We define low-performing schools as those with state test scores in the bottom three deciles for two of 
the three years beginning in the 2000-2001 school year.  We acknowledge that this definition does not 
actually allow for comparisons between schools in different states because state assessment systems 
differ.  However, we argue that the bottom 30% of schools in a state is a reasonable proxy for low 
performance.  In addition, defining  
low-performing schools as those that fall into the bottom three deciles for two out of three years allows 
us to include schools that may have been improving, in part, because of the presence of NBCTs.   
= 75% Minority Low-Performing = 75% Poverty 
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Figure 3. Proportions of NBCTs and All Teachers in High-Minority Schools 
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   Source: NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, NBCTs are underrepresented in schools with high concentrations 
of minority students in five of the six states.  California is the exception.  In California, a higher 
proportion of NBCTs work in schools with high concentrations of minority students, compared 
with the state’s average for all teachers.   
If we look at the distribution of NBCTs in high-poverty schools (schools with 75 
percent or more of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch), we see a similar pattern.  
With the exception of California, NBCTs are underrepresented in high-poverty schools.  Figure  
4 displays the percentage of NBCTs in high-poverty schools, compared with the state averages. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of NBCTs and All Teachers in High-Poverty Schools 
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Source: NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
As is the case with schools with high concentrations of minority students, NBCTs 
are underrepresented in high-poverty schools in five of the six states.  In other words, 
NBCTs are less likely to teach in these high-need schools than the average of all teachers in 
the states.  California again is the exception.  Unlike the other five states, NBCTs in 
California are overrepresented in high-poverty schools. 
If we examine the data for low-performing schools, the same pattern continues.  Figure  
5 displays the percentage of NBCTs and all teachers in low-performing schools. 
Figure 5. Percentage of NBCTs and All Teachers Teaching in Low-Performing Schools 
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Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), MDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004), NCDPI (2004), ODE 
(2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
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Figure 5 shows that NBCTs are underrepresented in low-performing schools in five out 
of the six states.  Again, California stands out as the exception.  If we examine the distribution of 
NBCTs in schools at the other end of the spectrum (those schools in the top three deciles of 
student achievement), we see that NBCTs are overrepresented in high-performing schools in 
each state except California.  Figure 6 compares the percentages of NBCTs teaching in high- and 
low-performing schools.7 
 
Figure 6. Percent of NBCTs in High- and Low-Performing Schools 
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Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), MDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004), NCDPI (2004), ODE 
(2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
As Figure 6 illustrates, there are lower percentages of NBCTs in low-performing schools 
than in high-performing schools, except in California. 
What Is Behind the California Difference? 
So what causes California to be different from the other five states?  If we look more 
closely at the distribution of NBCTs in California, we can begin to see the answer.  The 
difference is Los Angeles.  Figure 7 compares the number of NBCTs in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District (LAUSD) with the number of NBCTs in the rest of California (excluding 
LAUSD), focusing on NBCTs working in high-minority, high-poverty, and low-performing 
schools.  
                                                   
7 We define high-performing schools as those with test scores in the top three deciles of performance of 
the state for two of the three years beginning with the 2000-2001 school year. 
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Figure 7. Number of NBCTs in Various Types of Schools in California and Los Angeles 
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Source: CDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
Los Angeles has 909 of the 2,261 NBCTs in the state. As Figure 7 shows, large numbers 
of these Los Angeles teachers teach in schools with high concentrations of poor, minority, and 
low-performing students.  Indeed, when Los Angeles and California without Los Angeles are 
compared with our other five states in terms of the percentage of NBCTs teaching in low-
performing schools, Los Angeles stands out as the exception.  In addition, the gap between all 
teachers in low-performing schools and National Board Certified Teachers in low-performing 
schools is smaller in Los Angeles and California (without Los Angeles) than it is in the other 
states.  Figure 8 illustrates these two points. 
Figure 8. Percent of NBCTs in Low-Performing Schools in Los Angeles& Six States 
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Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), MDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004), NCDPI (2004), ODE 
(2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
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As Figure 8 illustrates, Los Angeles has a higher percentage of NBCTs teaching in low-
performing schools when compared with the six states.  Of course, Los Angeles has a higher 
proportion of low-performing schools than the six states.  By our definition of low-performing 
as those schools in the bottom three deciles in two out of three years, 48% of Los Angeles 
schools are considered low-performing.  By contrast, 22.9% of schools in California excluding 
LA, 23.4% of Florida schools, 25.2% of Mississippi schools, 27.4% of North Carolina schools, 
23.5% of Ohio schools, and 26.1% of South Carolina schools are low-performing. 
Figure 8 also points to a narrower gap in California and Los Angeles compared with 
other states in the percentage of National Board Certified Teachers and their non-Board 
certified colleagues working in low-performing schools.  This difference may be partly 
attributable to the large financial incentives available to National Board Certified Teachers 
working in low-performing schools in California, which we discuss later.  We also surmise that 
the intensive support programs for National Board candidates in Los Angeles account for some 
of the narrower gap.  However, it may simply be that the narrower gap is a function of the large 
number of low-performing schools in Los Angeles.     
Los Angeles Compared with Dade County 
As an additional point of comparison, we explored whether the Los Angeles 
phenomenon is a big-city phenomenon.  Could it be that other urban cores that “look” like Los 
Angeles display similar NBCT distribution patterns?  We reviewed NBCT data from Dade 
County (Miami), Florida, a district with demographics similar to those of Los Angeles.  
Interestingly, the data show that although both Los Angeles and Dade County have significant 
percentages of NBCTs working in low-performing schools, NBCTs are better represented in 
Los Angeles than in Dade County.  Figure 9 illustrates this point.   
Figure 9. Percentage of NBCTs and All Teachers in Low-Performing Schools: 
Los Angeles and Dade County 
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Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
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After noting the difference between the proportions of NBCTs in the two urban 
districts, we examined the proportions of NBCTs at each decile, compared with the distribution 
of all teachers in both districts by decile.  Figures 10 and 11 show the result.8  
Figure 10. Distribution of NBCTs and All Teachers in the  
Los Angeles Unified School District, by 2003 School Performance 
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Source: CDE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
Figure 11. Distribution of NBCTs and All Teachers in Dade County, by School Performance 
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Source: FDOE (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
                                                   
8  Only schools with test scores for the 2002-2003 school year are represented in Exhibits 10 and 11; thus, 
the numbers do not add to 100.  7.9% of teachers in Los Angeles and 3.0% of teachers in Dade County 
taught in schools that did not report test scores in 2002-2003.  
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In Los Angeles, NBCTs are slightly underrepresented in the bottom two deciles of 
performance, but overall Los Angeles appears to have a more equitable distribution of NBCTs 
than does Dade County.  Dade County does have a large number of NBCTs in its  
lowest-performing schools, but its NBCTs are underrepresented in the bottom two deciles of 
performance.  
Los Angeles’s Equity Gap 
Despite the appearance of an equitable distribution of NBCTs in Los Angeles, a second 
look uncovers an important equity gap.  Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is 
organized into 11 subdistricts; NBCTs are not distributed in proportion to their performance 
levels across these subdistricts.  Although each district contains low-performing schools, 
District I, which encompasses South Central Los Angeles, has the highest concentration of  
low-performing schools and poverty.   Table 1 shows the difference between District I and the 
rest of the Los Angeles subdistricts in terms of the percentage of NBCTs in the subdistrict, the 
percentage of schools that are in the bottom three deciles, and the percentage of schools in the 
bottom decile. 
Table 1 
Distribution of NBCTs in Los Angeles Unified School District Subdistricts 
Subdistrict Characteristics 
Subdistrict 
Percentage of 
Low-
Performing 
Schools 
Percentage of 
Schools with 
API 1 in 2003 
Percentage of 
Los Angeles 
NBCTs in 
Subdistrict 
A 26.1 4.3 10.8 
B 51.5 14.7 12.2 
C 28.8 2.7 8.8 
D 18.4 5.3 12.3 
E 38.7 11.3 9.9 
F 59.3 29.6 8.0 
G 71.2 38.5 8.8 
H 81.1 43.4 10.0 
I 82.2 57.8 3.4 
J 86.5 29.7 7.4 
K 35.7 4.3 8.4 
Source: CDE (2004), LAUSD (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Although Los Angeles has a reasonable distribution of NBCTs overall, its lowest-
performing subdistrict lags behind the other subdistricts in terms of the percentage of NBCTs. 
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Summing Up the Distribution of NBCTs  
These analyses lead to several conclusions.  First, NBCTs are not equitably distributed 
across schools that serve different populations of students.  In the six states with the largest 
numbers of NBCTs, poor, minority, and low-performing students are far less likely than their 
more affluent, majority, higher-performing peers to benefit from the teaching of an NBCT.  The 
significant exception to this pattern appears to be Los Angeles.  The Los Angeles example 
suggests that it is possible to ensure a more equitable distribution of NBCTs.  Although a close 
look at Los Angeles reveals remaining inequities, the district has succeeded in giving most of its 
lowest-performing students an equal chance to be taught by an NBCT.   
How do districts and states encourage teachers to become National Board Certified, and 
are incentives targeted to particular kinds of schools or categories of teachers? We turn next to 
an examination of this issue. 
Incentives and the Distribution of NBCTs 
Incentives related to National Board Certification fall into three categories: (1) incentives 
for becoming a candidate for National Board Certification, (2) incentives for earning National 
Board Certification, and (3) incentives for becoming National Board Certified and teaching in a 
low-performing school.  A review of available data shows that 31 states encourage teachers to 
pursue Board Certification by offering fee support.  Because the certification process costs each 
candidate $2,300, funds to offset this expense can serve as a considerable inducement (NBPTS, 
2004a). 
Thirty-two states provide incentives in the form of salary supplements to teachers who 
earn Board Certification.  These additional dollars most often are available to any NBCT, 
regardless of teaching assignment.  Los Angeles, for example, provides a 15 percent salary boost 
to teachers who become Board Certified and then agree to fulfill additional district-determined 
responsibilities.  A number of states also provide full or partial license reciprocity on the basis of 
National Board status, and 28 use National Board status as a proxy for full or partial license 
renewal. 
In addition to state incentives for pursuing or earning Board Certification, more than 
500 school districts provide incentives in the form of fee support and/or salary increases.  Local 
incentives are often added to state incentives. 
The third category is by far the most slender.  With the exception of the substantial 
California incentive and a $1,500 annual bonus in Columbus, Ohio, for National Board Certified 
Teachers who agree to be placed in challenging schools, no state or local incentives are aimed at 
linking NBCTs and low-performing schools.  Thus, although existing incentives are likely to 
have helped boost the overall number of NBCTs nationally, few have been designed to increase 
the number of NBCTs in schools that are most in need of outstanding teachers.   
Given the significant policy initiatives for NBCTs in California, it is useful to review the 
scale of the incentives in that state.  In 1998, California enacted a policy to pay any teacher who 
earned Board Certification a one-time $10,000 bonus.  In July 2000, the state adopted a policy 
that awarded Board Certified Teachers who teach in low-performing schools (those below the 
50th percentile on the API) a bonus of $20,000 over a period of four years.  This program 
represents a deliberate policy strategy to encourage the redistribution of accomplished teachers.  
Recently, the state ended the $10,000 bonus for all NBCTs but retained the more targeted 
$20,000 award (California Education Code, 2004).  
  17 
 
Unfortunately, the data currently available do not allow us to address some key questions 
of great concern to policy-makers.  First, we cannot determine what role the incentives play in 
encouraging teachers to apply for National Board Certification.  Second, we cannot determine 
whether incentives designed to encourage NBCTs to work in low-performing schools actually 
result in the movement of accomplished teachers.  We are currently conducting a survey of 
NBCTs that should help answer some of these questions.  However, anecdotal evidence from 
California, North Carolina, and Ohio suggests that the financial incentives are important 
inducements for prospective NBCTs.   
On the other hand, California’s targeted incentive for NBCTs to work in low-performing 
schools may not be targeted enough to persuade accomplished teachers to relocate to the 
neediest schools.  Part of the problem may be that since the state defines as low-performing all 
schools below the 50th percentile on the API, teachers in urban districts have no incentive to 
transfer to the neediest schools in the lowest deciles.  For example, under California’s definition 
of low-performing, more than 70% of teachers in Los Angeles qualify as working in low-
performing schools and are eligible for the state bonus.  At the same time, we do not know 
whether financial incentives alone are enough to entice accomplished teachers to move to the 
more challenging schools.  If NBCTs from the case study schools that are part of our larger 
research study are any indication, proximity to home, decent working conditions, a strong and 
supportive principal, and collegial relationships are important assignment considerations for 
accomplished teachers.     
 
Targeted Candidate Support  
What is clear from our case studies, and what we suspect survey data will confirm, is that 
professional support (in the form of coaching, working with other candidates, release time, and 
principal support) for National Board candidates also serves as an important incentive.  If Los 
Angeles is any indication, providing targeted support for National Board candidates already 
working in low-performing schools appears to have a salutary effect on the distribution of 
NBCTs.  LAUSD teachers interested in pursuing Board Certification have two major support 
programs available to them.  One is run jointly by the United Teachers Los Angeles (UTLA), the 
local teachers’ union, and the district.  The other operates under the auspices of the University 
of California at Los Angeles.  Both programs make an effort to recruit to the Board Certification 
process teachers who are already teaching in low-performing schools and want to remain there.  
In other words, these programs substantially focus their efforts on increasing the capacity of 
teachers in low-performing schools to earn Board Certification. 
These programs appear to increase the number of NBCTs in low-performing schools in 
the district, in part by achieving a high pass rate of teachers in these schools.  As Figure 12 
illustrates, higher percentages of Los Angeles teachers than of teachers in the rest of the state 
successfully complete the National Board Certification process.   
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Figure 12. Pass Rates in Los Angeles and the Rest of California 
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    Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), NBPTS (2003), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
The high pass rates of Los Angeles teachers suggest that the support programs make a 
significant difference for National Board candidates, particularly for those in low-performing 
schools.  Of course, the high pass rate may be partly a result of the support programs’ 
counseling out candidates least likely to pass.  Unfortunately, funding for the support programs 
serving LAUSD teachers may be ending with the district’s next round of budget cuts.   
Nevertheless, the Los Angeles experience is instructive.  Overall, the mix of supports 
and financial incentives available to teachers in Los Angeles appears to point to a potential 
means for beginning to resolve the maldistribution of NBCTs in low-performing schools.  
Incentives and the Transfer of NBCTs to Low-performing Schools 
In examining incentives to obtain National Board Certification, it is important to 
differentiate among various types of strategies that are intended to serve different purposes.  
One strategy identifies and supports prospective NBCTs already working in low-performing 
schools.  The support programs for National Board candidates in Los Angeles are examples of 
this approach.   
Perhaps the more challenging strategy, however, is to devise incentives to lure NBCTs to 
low-performing schools and encourage them to remain there.  The California example suggests 
that money by itself may not be an adequate inducement to encourage large numbers of high-
quality teachers to move from higher-performing to low-performing schools.  Support clearly is 
important.  But, as we suggested earlier in the paper, so are working conditions.  And working 
conditions are generally less favorable in low-performing than in higher-performing schools. 
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Realigning NBCT Distribution  
National Board Certified Teachers have been designated as “accomplished.”  Policy-
makers across the nation have determined that NBCTs ought to be a central part of any strategy 
to improve student achievement.  But as data from our six states show, NBCTs are found 
disproportionately in higher-performing, not lower-performing schools, thus blunting their 
potential impact.  
To be sure, the maldistribution of NBCTs is only one aspect of the larger problem of the 
skewed distribution of well-qualified teachers and the resulting inequitable distribution of 
resources among schools.  But as policy-makers craft policies designed to reward teachers who 
earn National Board Certification, they need to be careful not to craft policies that make the 
distribution of resources even more inequitable.  
The solution to attracting the best teachers to the most challenging schools would seem 
to lie in designing an appropriate package of incentives, as well as in taking steps to make these 
schools more attractive places for highly skilled teachers to teach.  Unfortunately, most current 
incentives to become NBCTs seem to be doing little to realign the distribution of excellent 
teachers.  
Rethinking Policy to Reshape Distribution   
If as a nation we are truly committed to ensuring that all students achieve at high levels, 
then we must devise policies that will encourage the most highly skilled teachers to teach the 
most vulnerable students.  Toward that end, it may be time to rethink incentive policies 
regarding NBCTs.  This shift in approach will require the active participation of the National 
Board, of states, and of local school districts.  
What Can The National Board Do? 
When the National Board was in its formative years, the organization was faced with a 
long agenda of crucial and challenging tasks.  Standards of accomplished practice needed to be 
developed for various fields and academic disciplines.  In all, the Board now offers certification 
in 27 fields geared to subject matter and students’ developmental levels.  
The decision was made early that assessments to gauge National Board Certification 
candidates’ achievement of these standards would be based on performance.  Thus, the Board 
set about designing valid and reliable assessments that would require candidates to demonstrate 
their knowledge and skill in a variety of ways.  Preliminary assessments were tested and retested 
to ensure that, to the extent possible, they were free from items or tasks that would disadvantage 
candidates on the basis of their race or teaching assignment. 
In addition, the Board needed to build a constituency for support.  Advanced 
certification for teaching was an entirely new concept.  National Board officials were mindful 
that the fledgling organization would not survive long without a broad-based consensus about 
the credibility and significance of its work.  The Board undertook a deliberate strategy to 
persuade states and districts to give National Board Certification policy standing through fee 
supports and salary incentives.  The effort was targeted to securing advantages for teachers 
generally to pursue National Board Certification. 
Early leaders of the National Board were aware of the likely maldistribution of NBCTs, 
but they viewed addressing the problem as a state and district responsibility.  As this paper has 
demonstrated, little action has been taken on this front.  National Board Certified Teachers 
remain concentrated in higher-performing schools.  The time may now have come for the 
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National Board to take bolder steps, to begin to promote more targeted policies such as those 
aimed at ameliorating NBCT distribution inequities highlighted in this paper. 
Although the National Board itself has no direct authority to impose policy actions, it 
can use its considerable influence, energy, and resources to encourage states and school districts 
to act in three areas: (1) to create greater equity in working conditions between high- and low-
performing schools, (2) to increase financial incentives and supports for teachers who work in 
low-performing schools to seek National Board Certification, (3) and to increase targeted 
financial incentives to encourage teachers who hold National Board Certification to select low-
performing schools.   
This approach, advocating policies directed at reconfiguring the distribution of NBCTs, 
would take the National Board down a new and different policy direction.  However, by 
remaining silent, the National Board gives its tacit approval to the continuing maldistribution of 
teachers.  Speaking out seems a risk worth taking. 
What Can States Do? 
State policy can have a powerful influence on the distribution of National Board 
Certified Teachers, and therefore on resource allocation.  States can and should enact policies 
that are designed to encourage National Board Certified Teachers to choose low-performing 
schools and to grow National Board Certified Teachers in low-performing schools.  States can 
both target candidate support programs to teachers who want to teach in low-performing 
schools and dedicate a designated percentage of fee support dollars to such teachers.  Where 
state policy creates barriers to interdistrict transfers by capping placement on salary schedules, 
such policies can be eliminated for National Board Certified Teachers who agree to teach in low-
performing schools.  And states can expand credential portability by issuing licenses for NBCTs 
who transfer from another state to low-performing schools. 
Moreover, although money alone may not be the single deciding factor in National 
Board Certified Teachers’ assignment preferences, fiscal incentives certainly provide a welcome 
and important boost.  States should consider financial remuneration as part of a comprehensive 
package of incentives and supports.  Failure to act only perpetuates serious inequities in resource 
allocation. 
What Can Districts Do? 
Districts hold the greatest sway over local barriers to NBCTs’ choosing low-performing 
schools.  In the more than 30 states in which teachers’ working conditions are substantially 
shaped through the process of collective bargaining, the local teachers’ union must play an active 
role in solving the NBCT maldistribution dilemma.  Unions must be encouraged to negotiate 
new compensation structures and transfer and assignment procedures that encourage Board 
Certified Teachers to choose the most challenging schools.  
All districts, whether subject to collective bargaining or not, can rededicate their efforts, 
and redirect some of their resources, to rectifying disparities in working conditions between 
high- and low-performing schools.  They can develop and implement targeted support programs 
for National Board candidates who already teach in low-performing schools, and they can 
structure compensation so that NBCTs who agree to accept assignments in low-performing 
schools receive a salary boost.   
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A Collective Effort 
Making low-performing schools more desirable workplaces for accomplished teachers 
will require the combined efforts of the National Board, of states, and of school districts.  In 
addition to the kinds of supports and incentives we have suggested in this paper, there also 
needs to be a collective effort to change the pervasive occupational norm that relegates those 
who choose to teach in low-performing schools to lower professional status.  If we are to 
succeed in providing the students in greatest need with the most expert teachers, it must become 
a badge of professional honor to teach in schools in the most desperate academic straits. 
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Appendix 
 
This appendix details the database of National Board Certified Teachers (NBCT), the creation of the 
Performance Index (PI), and data analysis methods used in the paper, Sharing the Wealth: National Board 
Certified Teachers and the Schools that Need Them Most.  
Overview of Analysis and Methods 
We began this analysis with a database of NBCTs in six states: California, Florida, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina, which together represent more than 65 percent of all NBCTs 
nationwide (NBPTS, 2004b). In order to analyze the school placement of these NBCTs and the 
placements of all teachers in the state for comparison, we first needed to categorize schools based on 
student performance and school characteristics.  
The differences in testing and accountability policies across the states made it impossible for us to 
directly equate tests and student achievement.  Instead, we assigned a Performance Index score to all 
schools with measures of student performance already collected by state accountability systems. The 
Performance Index score compares schools with similar grade configurations and identifies them in 
deciles, with PI1 schools in the bottom 10% of performance and PI10 schools in the highest 10%. In 
some cases, we used NCES Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Data: 2001-2002 (NCES) to 
compare schools of similar levels for the creation of the PI. In other cases, we relied solely on state 
data. The specific calculations of the Performance Index were different in each state, based on the 
respective state’s testing system and available data, and those methods are discussed in detail below.  
After creating the PI in each state, we merged the state files with NCES data. We used this method 
because 1) the data files provided by the states were not always comprehensive, and we needed a 
complete list of schools for the NBCT and whole-state analyses; and 2) we needed additional school 
indicators, such student characteristics and number of teachers in each school, for our analysis of 
teacher distribution.  
There were some schools in the NCES database that were not in the state accountability data, either 
because the school was not in existence in 2001-2002 or the school did not test at the grade level used 
to create the Performance Index. Similarly, there were some schools on the state lists that did not 
appear in the NCES database. The comparability of NCES data and state data is detailed in Tables 2A, 
6A, 9A, 12A, and 16A.  We used the NCES data for all school counts and analyses rather than the 
state level data, for consistency across states.  
After the state data was merged with NCES, we defined a school as low performing if it fell in the 
bottom three deciles of the Performance Index for at least two of the past three years (2003, 2002, 
2001). Schools with fewer than three years of data were included in our analysis, but by default are 
considered “Non-Low-Performing.” Table 1A shows how many schools had a Performance Index 
score in at least two of three years, and thus had sufficient data to be defined as low-performing.  
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Table 1A 
Number of Schools in Each State with Enough Data to Calculate School Performance 
State 
Schools with 
fewer than 
two years of 
data 
Schools with 
two or more 
years of data 
Percent of 
schools with 
two or more 
years of data 
Total schools 
in state 
California  1,394  7,522 84.4%  8,916 
Florida  665  2,754 80.5%  3,419 
Mississippi  190  847 81.7%  1,037 
North 
Carolina  206  2,028 90.8%  2,234 
Ohio  735  3,177 81.2%  3,912 
South 
Carolina  129  1,016 88.7%  1,145 
Total  3,319  17,344 83.9%  20,663 
Source: CDE (2004), FDOE (2004), MDE (2004), NCES (2004), NCDPI (2004), ODE (2004), 
SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
With complete databases of NBCTs and all teachers in each state, combined with the Performance 
Index and school demographic information, we completed our analysis of teacher and NBCT 
distribution. The results of this analysis are detailed in Tables 21A-29A. 
Database of National Board Certified Teachers 
The database of National Board Certified Teachers, which is the foundation of this analysis, was first 
developed using information furnished by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
(NBPTS). After the administration of our NBCT survey, which is part of our larger study of NBCTs 
in low-performing schools, follow-up was conducted and updated information was received about the 
school assignment of some NBCTs in the survey sample. The database used in this analysis is a 
combination of the data provided by the NBPTS and information obtained though the research 
team’s survey administration through March 2004.  
All of our analyses on NBCT distribution include only NBCTs who are teaching in schools and only 
those teachers who earned certification since 1998.  Thus, the total number of NBCTs reported by the 
NBPTS may be higher than the numbers reported in analysis. For example, per NBPTS, 2,644 
teachers in California have earned certification, but only 2,292 have been certified since 1998 and only 
2,261 of those are working in schools. 
Creation of the Performance Index 
As discussed above, the creation of the Performance Index was different in each state. The sections 
below detail how the PI was created in each of the six states used in analysis: California, Florida, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina.  
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California 
In California, the creation of the Performance Index was relatively straightforward. The state’s 
Academic Performance Index (API) compares schools at the same level (roughly elementary, middle, 
high school) in the state and ranks them by decile.  For this study, any school with an API score of 1, 
2, or 3 in two of three years was considered low performing. The state API data was merged with 
NCES 2001-2002 data for the analysis of NBCTs and California teacher distribution (Table 2A shows 
comparability of NCES and state data, and Table 22 shows the results of the distribution analyses).  
Table 2A 
Comparability of NCES and California State Data 
 
2003 2002 2001 
In NCES, but not state data 193  30 1,439 
In state data, but not 
NCES9 153  7  15 
In both databases 8,723 8,886 7,477 
Source: CDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Table 3A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES10) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003. Table 4A shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
                                                   
9 Only those schools with API scores are included in the counts. Note that the 2001 API contained far 
fewer schools than either the 2003 or the 2002 state data files (7,493 schools in 2001, 8,733 schools in 
2002, and 8,966 schools in 2003). 
10 NCES defines school level in the following way: (1) Primary (low graded = PK through 03; high grade 
= PK through 08), (2) Middle (low grade = 04 through 07; high grade = 04 through 09), (3) High (low 
grade = 07 through 12; high grade = 12 only), and (4) Other (any other configuration not falling within 
the above three categories, including ungraded).  
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Table 3A 
Percent of California Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index, 
by School Level 
 
2003 Performance Index N 
School 
Level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A* Total 
Elementary 
School 9.5 9.4 9.5 9.8 9.2 9.9 9.6 9.9 9.3 9.6  4.3  5,494 
Middle 
School 9.8 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.7 9.0 9.5 9.5  4.7  1,282 
High School 6.2 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.1  47.5  1,708  
Other 8.3 2.3 2.1 3.0 4.2 1.4 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.6  71.5  432 
Total 8.8 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.2 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.4  15.9  8,916 
Source: CDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
 
 
Table 4A 
Percent of California Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
School Level 
Total 
Schools LPS Percent 
Elementary School 5,494 1,534 27.9% 
Middle School 1,282 368 28.7% 
High School 1,708 282 16.5% 
Other  432  27 6.3% 
Total 8,916 2,211 24.8% 
Source: CDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Florida 
Florida's Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) includes assessments in reading and mathematics, 
which are administered to all students in Grades 3-10 each year, and a writing and science exam, which 
is given in grades 4, 5, 8, and 10. The state assigns students to one of five categories based on their 
performance, defining levels 3 and above as proficient for each grade level.   
In order to develop the Performance Index for Florida, we created a composite score of the percent 
of students failing to meet proficiency in reading and math (levels 1 and 2). Schools with the lowest 
percentages of students in levels 1 and 2 were assigned the highest Performance Index score (10).  
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Achievement data for 2001 was only available on the state’s website for 4th grade (reading), 5th grade 
(math), and 8th and 10th grade reading and math. To be consistent in the calculation for each year, we 
used rankings only for those grades and subjects in 2001, 2002, and 2003.  
In order to compare schools with like scores, in creating the Performance Index, we only compared 
schools in which students had taken the same tests. Because of the limited 2001 data, we were only 
able to include schools in our analysis that had 4th, 5th 8th, or 10th grade, which excluded some schools 
that did not fall into those categories. Table 5A shows the test configurations and the number of 
schools that fall into each category.  
 
Table 5A 
Florida Schools, by 2003 Test Configurations11 
Test data available 
Number of 
schools 
4th and 5th grade  1,686 
4th, 5th, and 8th grade  83 
4th, 5th, 8th, and 10th grade  89 
8th grade only  524 
8th and 10th grade   167 
10th grade only  434 
Total  2,983 
Source: FDOE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
To determine how many students did not meet the standards in a school, we created a weighted 
average across grades. Using the percentages of students scoring a 1 or 2 on the FCAT reading and 
math tests in grades 4, 5, 8, and 10, we determined how many total students in the school failed to 
meet proficiency. We only included in the denominator students who were counted as taking the test 
for a given grade level. Below is an example of the way that scores were weighted in schools with 
scores at multiple grades (the same weighting procedure was used to create average scores combining 
reading and math):  
 
(% students Grade1)*(# students Grade1) + (% students Grade2)*(# students Grade2) 
(# students Grade1) + (# students Grade2) 
 
After the Performance Index was calculated for each year, the data was merged with NCES data for 
analysis (Table 6A shows comparability of NCES and state data).  
 
                                                   
11 There were only 2,983 schools in the FDOE’s 2003 data for grades 4, 5, 8, and 10. Per NCES, there are 
3,419 schools in the state. The difference is largely because we were only able to include schools which 
tested in 4th, 5th, 8th or 10th grade. See Table 6 for details on the comparability of NCES and state data. 
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Table 6A 
Comparability of NCES and Florida State Data 
 
2003 2002 2001 
In NCES, but not state data 544 367 588 
In state data, but not 
NCES12 80 11 12 
In both databases 2,875 3,052 2,831 
Source: FDOE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
 
Table 7A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003.  Table 8 shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
 
 
Table 7A 
Percent of Florida Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index,  
by School Level 
 
2003 Performance Index N 
School 
Level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A* Total 
Elementary 
School 8.8  9.2  9.0 9.2 9.1  9.4 9.4  9.3  9.4 9.6  7.6  1,780 
Middle 
School 7.5  10.3  10.5 9.9 9.5  10.1 9.5  10.5  10.1 9.9  1.8  493  
High School 4.4  6.4  8.0 8.5 8.3  10.1 9.2  10.1  9.4 9.6  13.8  426  
Other 7.6  5.4  3.5 3.2 3.5  2.4 2.6  2.5  2.4 2.1  64.9  720  
Total 7.8  8.2  8.0 8.0 7.9  8.1 8.0  8.2  8.0 8.1  19.6  3,419  
Source: FDOE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 Only those schools with FCAT scores are included in the counts. 
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Table 8A 
Percent of Florida Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
 
School Level 
Total 
Schools LPS Percent 
Elementary 
School 1,780 472 26.5% 
Middle School  493 136 27.6% 
High School  426 83 19.5% 
Other  720 108 15.0% 
Total 3,419 799 23.4% 
Source: FDOE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Mississippi 
The Mississippi assessment program consists of the Mississippi Curriculum Test (MCT) in reading, 
language, and mathematics in grades 2-8; a writing assessment in grades 4 and 7; a norm-referenced 
test (TerraNova) in reading/language arts and mathematics in grade 6; and the Subject Area Testing 
Program (SATP) in high school for Algebra I, Biology I, US History, and English II.  
In 2003, there were 213 schools that had both SATP scores and MCT scores. Since the data from the 
two tests is not comparable, we chose to use the NCES definitions of school level to determine which 
test would be used for the creation of the Performance Index. In 2003, 180 of the Mississippi schools 
with SATP scores in English and Algebra were defined as high schools by NCES. For these schools, 
the SATP was used to create the Performance Index. We used the MCT for the remaining 676 schools 
with available test data. Note that there are 1,037 schools in Mississippi per NCES. Table 9A details 
the comparability of NCES and state data.   
On the MCT, the state assigns students to one of four categories based on their performance. 
Students in the lowest level of achievement demonstrate “minimal” proficiency. For non-high schools 
with MCT scores, the Performance Index was created by calculating a weighted average across grades 
based on the percentage of students that scored “minimal” on math and reading standards in grades 2-
8. Using these percentages, we determined how many total students in the school failed to meet 
standards, and then created the Performance Index, assigning schools with the highest percentages of 
students at “minimal” proficiency the lowest Performance Index score (1). Below is an example of the 
way that scores were weighted in schools with scores at multiple grades (the same weighting procedure 
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was used to create average scores combining reading and math): 
 
(% students Grade1)*(# students Grade1) + (% students Grade2)*(# students Grade2) 
(# students Grade1) + (# students Grade2) 
 
 
The SATP only reported percent passing in 2003 and 2002, so we created a composite of the mean 
scores in English and Algebra to create the Performance Index. Schools with the highest composite 
mean score were assigned the highest Performance Index score (10). Below is an example of the way 
that the composite scores were created for the SATP: 
 
(Mean Algebra)*(# Algebra Scores) + (Mean English)*(# English Scores) 
(# Algebra Scores) + (# English Scores) 
 
After the Performance Index was calculated for each year, the data was merged with NCES 2001-2002 
data for the analysis of NBCT and Mississippi teacher distribution (Table 9A shows the comparability 
of NCES and state data).  
Table 9A 
Comparability of NCES and Mississippi State Data 
 
2003 2002 2001 
In NCES, but not state data 191 186 188 
In state data, but not 
NCES13  10  4  4 
In both databases 846 851 849 
Source: MDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Table 10A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003. Table 11A shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
 
                                                   
13 Only those schools with MCT or SATP scores are included in the counts. 
  33 
Table 10A 
Percent of Mississippi Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index,  
by School Level 
 
2003 Performance Index N 
 School 
Level  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
10 N/A* Total 
 Element
ary  School 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5  4.8  441 
 Middle 
School 9.3 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8  2.2  183  
 High 
School 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.2  34.9  275  
 Other 5.1 5.1 5.1 4.3 4.3 5.8 5.1 5.1 3.6 2.9  53.6  138  
Total 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.8  18.8  1,037  
Source: MDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
 
Table 11A  
Percent of Mississippi Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
School 
Level 
Total 
School
s LPS Percent 
Elementary 
School  441 128 29.0% 
Middle 
School  183 54 29.5% 
High School  275 59 21.5% 
Other  138 20 14.5% 
Total 1,037 261 25.2% 
Source: MDE (2004), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
North Carolina 
In North Carolina, we used the state’s Performance Composite to create the Performance Index. This 
metric reflects the percentage of students in a school that achieve grade level proficiency, defined as a 
score of 3 out of 4 on 3rd through 8th End of Grade tests, or “proficient” on high school End of 
Course tests.   
In order to ensure that we compared similar schools in creating the Performance Index, we used the 
NCES grade level definition and grouped elementary, middle, high schools, and “other” schools into 
deciles. After the Performance Index was calculated for each year, the data was merged with NCES 
2001-2002 data for the analysis of NBCT and North Carolina teacher distribution (Table 12A shows 
comparability of NCES and state data).  
  34 
 
Table 12A 
Comparability of NCES and North Carolina State Data 
 
2003 2002 2001 
In NCES, but not 
state data 148 240 240 
In state data, but 
not NCES14  57  3  3 
In both databases 2,086 1,994  1,994 
Source: NCES (2004), NCPDI (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Table 13A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003. Table 14A shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
Table 13A 
Percent of North Carolina Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index,  
by School level 
 
2003 Performance Index N 
School 
Level  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
10 
N/A
*  Total 
Elementary 
School  9.4  9.3  10.0  9.3  9.3  9.9  9.7  9.3  9.4 9.7  4.8  1,316  
Middle 
School  10.3  9.9  9.9  9.6  9.6  10.3  9.2  10.3  9.6 9.2  2.0  456  
High School  9.7  9.5  9.5  10.3  9.7  10.6  9.2  9.5  9.7 8.3  4.0  349  
Other  3.5  8.8  8.8  8.0  8.0  7.1  8.8  7.1  7.1 6.2  26.5  113  
Total  9.4  9.4  9.8  9.4  9.4  9.9  9.4  9.4  9.4 9.2  5.2  2,234  
Source: NCES (2004), NCPDI (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
 
 
                                                   
14 Only those schools with a North Carolina state performance composite are included in the counts. 
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Table 14A 
Percent of North Carolina Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
School 
Level 
Total 
Schoo
ls LPS Percent 
Elementary 
School 1,316 371 28.2% 
Middle 
School  456 132 28.9% 
High School  349 94 26.9% 
Other  113 15 13.3% 
Total 2234 612 27.4% 
Source: NCES (2004), NCPDI (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Ohio 
From 2001 to 2003, the state of Ohio only tested students in grades 4, 6, and 9. In each of the state’s 
grade level achievement tests, Ohio reports the percentage of students in each grade and subject who 
demonstrated proficiency on the standards.  
In order to create the Performance Index, we only compared schools in which students had taken the 
same tests. Table 15A shows the test configurations and the number of schools that fall into each 
category. We computed the Performance Index score for each school by taking a simple average of 
the percent who demonstrated proficiency in reading and math in each of the tested grades (the scores 
could not be weighted, because the state did not provide the number of students taking each test).  
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Table 15A 
Ohio Schools, by 2003 Test Configurations15 
Grade Levels 
Number of 
Schools 
Percent at which a school is in 
the bottom three deciles 
4th grade only  1,230 55.25% passing and below 
6th grade only  494 52.45% passing and below 
9th grade only  703 78.85% passing and below 
4th and 6th grade  796 48.85% passing and below 
4th, 6th, and 9th grade16  21 46.13% passing and below 
Total   3,244 --- 
Source: ODE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
After the Performance Index was calculated for each year, the data was merged with NCES 2001-2002 
data for the analysis of NBCT and Ohio teacher distribution (Table 16A shows comparability of 
NCES and state data, and Table 26A shows the results of the distribution analyses).  
Table 16A 
Comparability of NCES and Ohio State Data 
 
2003 2002 2001 
In NCES, but not 
state data 282 282 282 
In state data, but 
not NCES17  71  27  0 
In both databases 3,630 3,630 3,630 
Source: NCES (2004), ODE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Table 17A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003. Table 18A shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
 
Table 17A 
Percent of Ohio Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index,  
                                                   
15 There were only 3,244 schools in the ODE’s 2003 data for grades 4, 6, and 9. Per NCES, there are 3,912 
schools in the state. The difference is largely because we were only able to include schools which tested 
in 4th, 6th, or 9th grade. See Table 6 for details on the comparability of NCES and state data. 
16 Note that there are some schools in this category that have 6th and 9th grades and other that have all 
three testing levels. There were so few schools in this category that it made sense to consolidate the two. 
17 Only those schools Ohio state with assessment scores are included in the counts. The state data 
retrieved from the website contained all three years in one file.  
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by School Level 
 
2003 Performance Index N 
School 
Level  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
10 N/A Total 
Elementary 
School 8.3 8.7 8.6 8.9 8.5 8.8 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.7 13.6 2,175 
Middle 
School 6.3 6.8 8.3 7.3 7.5 7.3 7.9 7.5 7.4 8.1 25.6  731 
High School 7.1 8.3 8.8 8.8 8.7 9.1 8.5 8.7 8.9 9.1 14.1  761 
Other 13.1 3.7 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.1 2.0 60.8  245 
Total 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.2 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.2 18.9  3,912 
Source: NCES (2004), ODE (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
 
Table 18A 
Percent of Ohio Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
School Level 
Total 
Schools LPS Percent 
Elementary 
School 2,175 552 25.4% 
Middle School  731 144 19.7% 
High School  761 183 24.0% 
Other  245 39 15.9% 
Total  3,912 918 23.5% 
Source: NCES (2004), ODE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
South Carolina 
The Palmetto Achievement Challenge Tests (PACT) are administered in mathematics and English 
language arts to South Carolina students in grades 3 through 8. According to the state, a student who 
performs at the “below basic” level on the PACT has not met minimum expectations for student 
performance based on the state curriculum standards. South Carolina tests high school students using 
the Exit Exam.  
The state performance data was available on the website by grade level, with no comprehensive list of 
schools. In order to combine the scores from all schools, we merged the SC data with NCES data to 
create the Performance Index.  
There were a few schools that had both Exit Exam and PACT scores (only 22 schools in 2001). To 
create the Performance Index, we used the Exit Exam for all schools identified by NCES as high 
schools, and used the PACT scores for all others. Using the high school Exit Exam, we ranked the 
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schools in deciles, assigning the highest Performance Index scores to schools with the highest pass 
rates.   
For non-high schools with PACT scores, we calculated the Performance Index by creating a weighted 
average across grades based on the percentage of students that scored “below basic” on math and 
reading standards in grades 3 through 8. Using these percentages, we determined how many total 
students in the school failed to meet proficiency, and then created the Performance Index, assigning 
schools with the highest percentages of students at “below basic” the lowest Performance Index score 
(1). Below is an example of the way that scores were weighted in schools with scores at multiple 
grades (the same weighting procedure was used to create average scores combining reading and math): 
 
(% students Grade1)*(# students Grade1) + (% students Grade2)*(# students Grade2) 
(# students Grade1) + (# students Grade2) 
 
Table 19A below shows the number of schools in each school level (as defined by NCES) that were 
assigned to each decile in 2003. Table 20A shows the percent of schools defined as “low-performing” 
(scoring in the bottom three deciles of student performance in two of three years), by school level.  
Table 19A  
Percent of South Carolina Schools in Each Decile in the 2003 Performance Index, 
by School Level 
 2003 Performance Index N 
School 
Level  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
 
10 N/A* Total 
Elementary 
School 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.4 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.0 9.2 7.6  619  
Middle 
School 9.8 10.2 10.2 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.4 10.2 9.8 1.6  256  
High School 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.3 7.3 25.4  248  
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0  22  
Total 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.7 11.9  1,145  
Source: NCES (2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
* N/A (No PI score is associated with school) 
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Table 20A  
Percent of South Carolina Schools Defined as “Low-Performing,”  
by School Level 
Level 
(NCES) 
Total 
Schools LPS Percent 
Elementary 
School  619 173 27.9% 
Middle 
School  256 74 28.9% 
High School  248 50 20.2% 
Other  22  2 9.1% 
Total 1145 299 26.1% 
 Source: NCES (2004), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
Results of Analyses  
This section will cover the results of the distribution analysis using the Performance Indices in each 
state, as well as the additional analysis completed on NBCT subdistrict distribution and NBCT pass 
rates in the Los Angeles Unified School District.  
Results of Teacher Distribution Analysis 
For the analyses of teacher and NBCT distribution, we chose to categorize schools in the following 
ways:  
· Schools with 75% or more minority students – as defined by NCES  
· Schools with 75% or more students eligible for free or reduced priced lunch –as defined 
by NCES 
· Low-Performing Schools – schools with a PI score of 1-3 in two of three years 
(calculation of PI defined in detail above) 
· High Performing Schools – schools with a PI score of 8-10 in two of three years 
(calculation of PI defined in detail above) 
· 2003 PI – schools with 2003 PI scores  
 
After these variables were created, we calculated the number of schools in each category (TableA 21) 
and the number of teachers and NBCTs teaching in each type of school in each state (Tables 22A-
27A). Note that in all states, we ranked schools based on their performance, which means that roughly 
10% of schools with available test scores are in each decile in each year. In subsequent analyses, we 
report the number of teachers in each state who teach in such schools. If a state has uneven staffing 
distributions, schools in each decile could have far fewer or far more than 10% of teachers.  
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Table 24A 
National Board Certified Teachers and All Teachers in Mississippi 
 NBCTs Mississippi Teachers 
 # % # % 
Total Teachers 1,567 * 31,126.6 * 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more students eligible for 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 
 279 17.8 10,720.2 34.4 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more minority students  248 15.8 9,992.4 32.1 
Teachers in low performing 
schools  167 10.7 8,178.6 26.3 
Teachers in high performing 
schools  691 44.1 9,290.7 29.8 
Teachers in PI 1 schools (2003)  39 2.5 2,744.8 8.8 
Teachers in PI 2 schools (2003)  48 3.1 2,604.8 8.4 
Teachers in PI 3 schools (2003)  69 4.4 2,764.2 8.9 
Teachers in PI 4 schools (2003)  90 5.7 2,717.8 8.7 
Teachers in PI 5 schools (2003)  173 11.0 2,719.6 8.7 
Teachers in PI 6 schools (2003)  160 10.2 3,067.4 9.9 
Teachers in PI 7 schools (2003)  166 10.6 2,982.9 9.6 
Teachers in PI 8 schools (2003)  220 14.0 3,391.0 10.9 
Teachers in PI 9 schools (2003)  238 15.2 3,118.8 10.0 
Teachers in PI 10 schools 
(2003)  232 14.8 2,785.3 8.9 
Number of Teachers with no PI 
Associated (2003)  132 8.4 2,230.0 7.2 
Source: MDE (2004), NCES (2004), NBPTS (2004c); SRI analysis. 
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Table 25A 
National Board Certified Teachers and All Teachers in North Carolina 
 
NBCTs 
North Carolina 
Teachers 
 # % # % 
Total Teachers 5,704 * 88,123.0 * 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more students eligible for 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 
 331 5.8 9,372.0 10.6 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more minority students  354 6.2 11,260.0 12.8 
Teachers in low performing 
schools  947 16.6 23,372.0 26.5 
Teachers in high performing 
schools 2,257 39.6 26,165.0 29.7 
Teachers in PI 1 schools (2003)  198 3.5 6,816.0 7.7 
Teachers in PI 2 schools (2003)  304 5.3 8,160.0 9.3 
Teachers in PI 3 schools (2003)  441 7.7 8,351.0 9.5 
Teachers in PI 4 schools (2003)  515 9.0 8,572.0 9.7 
Teachers in PI 5 schools (2003)  521 9.1 8,741.0 9.9 
Teachers in PI 6 schools (2003)  633 11.1 9,329.0 10.6 
Teachers in PI 7 schools (2003)  648 11.4 8,969.0 10.2 
Teachers in PI 8 schools (2003)  660 11.6 8,904.0 10.1 
Teachers in PI 9 schools (2003)  736 12.9 9,235.0 10.5 
Teachers in PI 10 schools 
(2003)  855 15.0 8,324.0 9.4 
Number of Teachers with no PI 
Associated (2003)  193 3.4 2,722.0 3.1 
Source: NCES (2004), NBPTS (2004c), NCDPI (2004); SRI analysis. 
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Table 26A 
National Board Certified Teachers and All Teachers in Ohio 
 NBCTs Ohio Teachers 
 # % # % 
Total Teachers 1731 * 112,850.2 * 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more students eligible for 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 
 98 5.7  11,237.1 10.0 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more minority students  137 7.9 11,974.3 10.6 
Teachers in low performing 
schools  353 20.4 29,648.4 26.3 
Teachers in high performing 
schools  582 33.6 29,134.7 25.8 
Teachers in PI 1 schools (2003)  109 6.3  9,885.9 8.8 
Teachers in PI 2 schools (2003)  120 6.9 10,292.4 9.1 
Teachers in PI 3 schools (2003)  137 7.9  9,182.4 8.1 
Teachers in PI 4 schools (2003)  106 6.1  9,267.2 8.2 
Teachers in PI 5 schools (2003)  131 7.6  8,748.3 7.8 
Teachers in PI 6 schools (2003)  137 7.9  8,975.1 8.0 
Teachers in PI 7 schools (2003)  138 8.0  9,316.0 8.3 
Teachers in PI 8 schools (2003)  141 8.1  9,684.5 8.6 
Teachers in PI 9 schools (2003)  199 11.5 10,044.2 8.9 
Teachers in PI 10 schools 
(2003)  255 14.7  9,966.1 8.8 
Number of Teachers with no PI 
Associated (2003)  258 14.9 17,488.1 15.5 
Source: NCES (2004), NBPTS (2004c), ODE (2004); SRI analysis. 
 
 
  46 
 
Table 27A 
National Board Certified Teachers and All Teachers in South Carolina 
NBCTs 
South Carolina 
Teachers 
 
# % # % 
Total Teachers 3,056 * 45,897.8 * 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more students eligible for 
Free and Reduced Price Lunch 
295 9.7 8,190.4 17.8 
Teachers in Schools with 75% 
or more minority students 266 8.7 80,51.5 17.5 
Teachers in low performing 
schools 436 14.3 11,519.6 25.1 
Teachers in high performing 
schools 1,266 41.4 13,683.1 29.8 
Teachers in PI 1 schools 
(2003) 102 3.3 3,695.2 8.1 
Teachers in PI 2 schools 
(2003) 156 5.1 3,996.7 8.7 
Teachers in PI 3 schools 
(2003) 213 7.0 3,915.9 8.5 
Teachers in PI 4 schools 
(2003) 289 9.5 4,535.7 9.9 
Teachers in PI 5 schools 
(2003) 269 8.8 4,182.1 9.1 
Teachers in PI 6 schools 
(2003) 342 11.2 4,800.1 10.5 
Teachers in PI 7 schools 
(2003) 331 10.8 4,410.8 9.6 
Teachers in PI 8 schools 
(2003) 396 13.0 4,665.3 10.2 
Teachers in PI 9 schools 
(2003) 299 9.8 4,647.2 10.1 
Teachers in PI 10 schools 
(2003) 493 16.1 4,360.6 9.5 
Number of Teachers with no PI 
Associated (2003) 166 5.4 2,688.2 5.9 
Source: NCES (2004), NBPTS (2004c), SCDE (2004); SRI analysis. 
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Analysis of NB Candidate Pass Rates in California 
In order to compare the number of NBCTs at each API level, we used a database of 2001-2002 
NBCTs (which was provided to SRI as part of the SRI study, Exploring the Differences in Minority and 
Majority Teachers' Decisions about and Preparation for NBPTS Certification), and used the NCES identifiers 
within to link each National Board Candidate’s school to the 2001-2002 California API scores. On the 
file provided by NBPTS, there were three categories of certification status: Not achieved, Achieved, 
and blank. Blank records indicate that the candidate is still in the certification process (has not yet 
completed the requirements). For the purposes of our analyses, we include both blank and Not 
Achieved in the denominator when calculating pass rates. Table 29A shows the total number of 
teachers attempting certification in 2001-2002, as well as the percentage of teachers in each 
certification status category. 
Table 29A 
Pass Rates of National Board Candidates in Los Angeles and the Rest of California 
 Los Angeles Candidates California Candidates (Excluding LA) 
API 
score 
% 
Achieved 
% Not 
Achieved % Blank Total # 
% 
Achieved 
% Not 
Achieved % Blank Total # 
1 29.1 52.5 18.4 158 23.4 58.4 18.2 154 
2 35.2 52.3 12.5 128 20.4 58.3 21.3 211 
3 37.6 50.6 11.8 85 31.8 48.8 19.4 129 
4 37.0 48.1 14.8 54 30.0 45.5 24.5 110 
5 32.3 58.1 9.7 31 32.8 52.7 14.5 131 
6 40.7 44.4 14.8 27 35.3 52.9 11.8 102 
7 30.8 61.5 7.7 13 35.2 49.1 15.7 108 
8 50.0 30.0 20.0 10 35.2 45.7 19.0 105 
9 63.6 27.3 9.1 11 44.2 45.3 10.5 86 
10 50.0 40.0 10.0 10 51.8 37.1 11.2 170 
No API 
Score 44.4 44.4 11.1 27 34.5 44.8 20.7 58 
Total 35.6 50.4 14.1 554 33.2 49.7 17.1 1364 
Source: CDE (2004), NBPTS (2003), NCES (2004); SRI analysis. 
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